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Abstract: “Beautiful Security” is a paradigm that requires security ceremonies to contribute to the ‘beauty’ of a user
experience. The underlying assumption is that people are likely to be willing to engage with more beautiful
security ceremonies. It is hoped that such ceremonies will minimise human deviations from the prescribed
interaction, and that security will be improved as a consequence. In this paper, we explain how we went about
deriving beautification principles, and how we tested the efficacy of these by applying them to specific secu-
rity ceremonies. As a first step, we deployed a crowd-sourced platform, using both explicit and metaphorical
questions, to extract general aspects associated with the perception of the beauty of real-world security mech-
anisms. This resulted in the identification of four beautification design guidelines. We used these to beautify
the following existing security ceremonies: Italian voting, user-to-laptop authentication, password setup and
EU premises access. To test the efficacy of our guidelines, we again leveraged crowd-sourcing to determine
whether our “beautified” ceremonies were indeed perceived to be more beautiful than the original ones. The
results of this initial foray into the beautification of security ceremonies delivered promising results, but must
be interpreted carefully.
1 INTRODUCTION
Security measures can trigger unintended and unan-
ticipated side effects if users consider them unattrac-
tive. By unattractive, we mean difficult, arduous, in-
convenient and generally a nuisance. If people per-
ceive their interactions with security systems nega-
tively, instead of something that is there to protect
them and their data, they might try to bypass or game
them (for instance, by using weak passwords). People
will dread an encounter with a system they consider
unattractive. Yet “beauty” is likely to be in the mind
of the beholder, and it is not necessarily obvious how
to beautify security systems.
Bella and Vigano` introduced the beautiful security
approach (Bella and Vigano`, 2015), postulating that
security should:
1. become a primary, inherent feature of the system;
at the same time,
2. not be disjoint from the system functionalities; at
the same time,
3. contribute to the very positive experience that the
user has of the system, ultimately making that ex-
perience beautiful.
While the first two are dealt with elsewhere, the third
is the one that this paper is concerned with: how can
security ceremonies contribute to the positive experi-
ence that a user has of a secured system, ultimately
triggering a perception of beauty?
Because users are an essential and integral part of
the greater socio-technical system, they have to en-
gage with security ceremonies (Ellison, 2007), which
are added to systems in order to secure them.
An example of a ceremony is an access control
system that restricts access to authorised users by re-
quiring the user to identify and authenticate them-
selves.
Users engage in a kind of ‘ritual’ with security cer-
emonies, with predetermined actions being actioned
by the two parties in a prescribed order when they in-
teract with the ceremony. The result may be that inter-
action with the security ceremony is far from straight-
forward. The need to ensure the security of systems
may unintentionally make interaction with security
ceremonies complex (and possibly unattractive).
A number of approaches have been developed to
inform the design and analysis of secure ceremonies,
e.g., (Bella and Coles-Kemp, 2012; Radke et al.,
2011; Karlof et al., 2009; Martina et al., 2015), but
these seem to neglect the notion of beauty. We coin
the term “beautification” to refer to the process of
making security ceremonies (more) beautiful. We
know that beautifying existing ceremonies by merely
simplifying them has sometimes led to the deploy-
ment of insecure ceremonies. Such ceremonies con-
tain vulnerabilities that could be exploited by an at-
tacker. A prime example is the use of fallback ques-
tions to allow people to recover from forgotten pass-
words, but which often serve as a convenient back
door for attackers (Schechter et al., 2009). In sum,
it is known that security ceremonies have functional
goals that guarantee requisite security properties. For
example, a password recovery ceremony must ensure
confidentiality of the replacement password.
This need motivates the need for a methodology
that makes beautiful security practically applicable.
Such a methodology is the main contribution of this
paper. We leveraged crowdsourcing to help us to ori-
ent security ceremony design towards greater beauty.
The methodology was applied, as a proof of concept,
to four real-world security ceremonies aimed, respec-
tively, at voting, logging into a computer, setting up
a password and entering physical premises. Our find-
ings are promising but require careful interpretation,
as we shall explain.
We commence with a brief review of the relevant
literature (§2) and continue by presenting our method-
ology. The first step was to consult crowdsourcing
platform participants using questions aimed at gath-
ering their views on what makes cyber security beau-
tiful (§3). The second step was to leverage such views
to formulate beautifying guidelines to inform the de-
sign of more beautiful ceremonies (§4). The third
step applied the guidelines to existing ceremonies,
attempting to make them more beautiful (§5). The
fourth and final step returns to the crowdsourcing plat-
form participants to determine whether the intended
beautification of the ceremonies was successful (§6).
We draw conclusions and discuss future work in §7.
2 BEAUTY IN SECURITY
Beauty is traditionally thought of as something vi-
sual, but it has also been applied to music (Portanova,
1975), mathematics (Erickson, 2011; Russell, 1956),
truth (Nass et al., 2000) and design (Gelernter, 1998).
Carritt (Carritt, 1932) claims that beauty is not
simply related to the agreeableness or usefulness of
an item or experience. He says that beauty has more
to do with a contemplation of a feeling experienced
during, or remembered after, an encounter with a par-
ticular artefact. Hence, beauty is interwoven with a
person’s experiences.
What characteristics of this experience might con-
tribute to beauty? The literature suggests the fol-
lowing: ease of use (fluency) (Reber et al., 2004),
a sense of pleasure (Tatarkiewicz, 2006), simplicity
(Chen et al., 2005; Karvonen, 2000; Glynn, 2010),
aptness (Gelernter, 1998), elegance (Gelernter, 1998),
the value of the system in a given context (goodness)
(Hassenzahl and Monk, 2010) and responsiveness
(Pancake, 2001). This review suggests that beauty
will be attributed to an artefact if it elicits positive
feelings, based on prior user experiences.
Let us now consider the idea of beautiful secu-
rity software. This is especially important because
its non-use or, worse, a negative experience of an
unattractive ceremony, will compromise security and
leave holes open for hackers to exploit. Current
experiences of common security software appear to
confirm their general unattractiveness (Cranor and
Garfinkel, 2005; Sheng et al., 2006; Clark et al.,
2011). The consequence is that users might act to
circumvent the ritual (Blythe et al., 2013). Aware-
ness and training programmes are the standard or-
ganisational response to this (Yildirim, 2016), but
the effectiveness of such drives is patchy (Banfield,
2016; Kennedy and Kennedy, 2016). Training does
not work because it can not overcome a reluctance
that stems from previous negative experiences with
unattractive software.
What we are proposing in this paper is to beau-
tify security ceremonies so that people will want to
use them because the beauty thereof results in pos-
itive feelings. What we seek to discover is exactly
how to achieve this. In summary, we want to build se-
curity ceremonies that users will want to engage with
because doing so has been a positive experience. This
might mean that the software displays one or more of
the general characteristics listed above. It could also
be that beautiful security ceremonies have their own
set of characteristics: identifying these is the topic of
this paper.
3 CROWDSOURCING FOR THE
CONCEPT OF BEAUTIFUL
SECURITY
Bella and Vigano` (Bella and Vigano`, 2015) asked a
fundamental question: what constitutes a beautiful
user experience of a security ceremony? Answer-
ing this question is far from trivial both because of
the vastness of the spectrum of possible answers and
because, as researchers working in security, our own
point of view is likely to be biased. For these reasons,
we decided to source an answer to this question from
a heterogeneous global crowd of people by means of
a questionnaire.
Our questionnaire aimed to gain an understand-
ing of how the users of security ceremonies perceive
and describe them by means of a scale of “emotional”
values, leaving them free to express as many values as
they desired. In other words, we designed the ques-
tionnaire to explore a correlation between security
ceremonies and how their beauty is sensed. The ques-
tionnaire consisted of the following four questions:
Q1 Think about when you log into your bank account,
and you use one of those little devices the bank
sends you that displays a number for you to enter
as your password. Do you consider this process to
be: Fun, Beautiful, Excessive, Annoying, Engag-
ing, Essential, Reassuring, Appealing?
Q2 When you were a child, did you ever read a
book about a group of children having a secret
club, with meetings where people were allowed in
when they knew the secret password? In this case,
how would you rate the security of this process
in terms of: Fun, Beautiful, Excessive, Annoying,
Engaging, Essential, Reassuring, Appealing?
Q3 Think about a web-based system that requires you
to provide a password that meets certain rules
(e.g., upper case, lower case, digit, special char-
acter, minimum length). In this case, how would
you rate the security in terms of: Fun, Beautiful,
Excessive, Annoying, Engaging, Essential, Reas-
suring, Appealing?
Q4 Think about old-fashioned burglar alarms that
used to go off every time a bird landed on the roof,
or lightning struck nearby. The only way to cor-
rect a false alarm was to get home as quickly as
possible to enter the PIN to shut it up. Modern
systems are different. They are often controlled
from your smartphone. Now you can keep an eye
on them from wherever you are in the world, and
even see if everything at home is in order, by link-
ing to cameras in your home. False alarms can
quickly and easily be dealt with, without annoying
your neighbours for hours on end. This is an ex-
ample of how physical security has become more
engaging. Can you think of a way that cyber se-
curity could improve in the same way?
The first three questions were closed-ended, al-
lowing people to respond with multiple preferences
(and thus allowing us to gain insights into their feel-
ings, where these could not be represented by only
one choice). The final question was open-ended. The
rationale behind the questions is as follows.
3.1 Q1 — Token device
The first question concerns the technology that people
use to confirm their identity upon login to their own
online bank accounts. Originally, when a customer
activated the e-banking functionalities on their bank
account the bank would supply them with a plastic
card or a sheet of paper with several one-time pass-
words (OTPs) to enable them to carry out two-factor
authentication1, in this case using their username-
password pair as well as a OTP. More recently, banks
started handing out small electronic devices to their
customers that are capable of generating an OTP on
the fly, instead of their having to consult a pre-printed
list of fixed OTPs. Nowadays, these devices are very
common2.
We devised the first question to explore reactions
to OTPs as a mechanism that is widely used to pre-
vent bank-account hacking but that is sometimes not
as usable as it should be (Subashini and Sumithra,
2014). OTP devices are intended to help users to
handle a situation in which security ought to be the
first goal, even though the way it achieves this might
not be ideal. We wanted to find out what respondents
thought about needing to possess such a physical de-
vice to generate OTPs. This question allowed us to
gather evidence to understand whether current two-
factor authentication ceremonies are in line with our
ideas or whether we ought to start thinking about al-
ternative approaches.
3.2 Q2 — Secret club
The second question is about using an episode of the
British pre-school animated television series “Peppa
Pig” (Bella and Vigano`, 2015). In this episode, ti-
tled “The Secret Club”, Peppa’s friend Suzy Sheep is
building a secret club whose membership is identified
by wearing a mask. Joining the club demands utter-
ing a one-time password, as shown by the following
excerpt:
1Two-factor authentication asks the user who wishes to
be authenticated to provide two different secrets: something
the user knows (e.g., a password), something the user has
(e.g., a device), something the user is (e.g., unique biomet-
ric features such as fingerprints or the patterns on a per-
son’s retina blood vessels). This can be straightforwardly
extended to multi-factor authentication, where the user has
to provide multiple different authentication factors.
2In fact, mobile applications have been developed to en-
able users to generate OTPs on their smartphones, thus re-
placing also these small electronic devices. However, given
that these mobile applications are not yet widespread (only
some countries and some banks have adopted them so far),
we decided not to include this option in our questionnaire.
Peppa: Hello, Suzy.
Suzy: Hello, Peppa.
Peppa: Why have you got that mask on your face?
Suzy: So people don’t know it’s me. I’m in a
secret club.
Peppa: Wow! Can I be in your secret club?
Suzy: Shh! It’s not easy to get into. You have to




Suzy: Right, you’re in.
Later on Suzy will comment that the password
changes all the time to keep it secret! It would ap-
pear that anything related to secrecy is perceived to
be an enjoyable game, even before the rules are set,
and Bella and Vigano` use this to propose that a user’s
experience of a security ceremony could be appeal-
ing and beautiful as is demonstrated by the childish
enthusiasm with which Peppa reacts in this episode.
What would our respondents think of a similar sit-
uation? Even though it could seem a fairly childish
example, we devised the second question to help the
respondents connect with similar experiences from
their own childhoods, thereby allowing us to deter-
mine whether the respondents agreed with Bella and
Vigano`’s assessment of the attractiveness of this ex-
ample. Thus, this second question aimed to give us a
reference point for the kind of user experience that we
would like to achieve when security is seen in terms
of beauty and attractiveness.
3.3 Q3 — Password Creation
Given that the second question considered passwords
in a childish context, we devised the subsequent ques-
tion to ask about passwords in a more adult context,
thus also allowing us to check whether the answers
obtained would be in line with those given in response
to Q2. More specifically, Q3 considers a thorny situa-
tion that users have to face at least once a day. A cloud
service, an email account, a favourite e-commerce
website, or maybe a laptop account, all require the
user to enter a secret password correctly to gain ac-
cess. Nowadays, this usually requires a strong pass-
word that respects certain criteria (such as a minimum
length, different characters, special characters) and is
also semantically different from the user’s sensitive
information (such as name or birth date). We asked
respondents to express how they felt about engaging
with this particular security ceremony. We expected
to obtain results that would reflect the users’ frustra-
tion with current password management systems.
3.4 Q4 — Cyber security improvement
We chose to conclude with an open question to cap-
ture the respondents’ different points of view. Cyber
security will continue to evolve and we believe that
this evolution could take many different directions.
We devised the final question to collect a wide va-
riety of suggestions about the different ways of mak-
ing security ceremonies more attractive, and thus of
pursuing beauty. By using an analogy with an old-
fashioned burglar alarm, we asked respondents to as-
sess the attractiveness of modern solutions and to pro-
pose improvements related to cyber security.
3.5 Findings
We administered the questionnaire to one hundred re-
spondents. We used the CrowdFlower platform and
did not constrain respondents in terms of language or
geography. CrowdFlower workers span the globe so
we were assured of a heterogeneous sample. The re-
sults for the first three questions are summarised in
Figure 1, whereas Table 1 shows the results of the an-
swers to Q4.




















Figure 1: The answers to questions Q1, Q2 and Q3
3.5.1 Findings from Q1, Q2 and Q3
The answers to Q1 show that users most often per-
ceive these kinds of ceremonies to be Essential (48)
and Reassuring (41). The third most popular reaction
is that engaging with the ceremony is Annoying (20),
confirming that users find it frustrating. The least cho-
sen options are: Fun (5), Appealing (4) and Beautiful
(2). This reinforces our initial assertions about the
unattractiveness of current security ceremonies.
In Q2, users largely chose Fun (66), followed by
Engaging (19) and Beautiful (12), and finally Annoy-
ing (7) and Excessive (6). This could mean that the
users see that the situation is less serious but also that
they perceive this to be less burdensome than rigorous
security ceremonies. This is so even though the secret
mentioned in the cartoon is very similar to an actual
password.
In Q3, we can observe similar responses to Q1.
We obtained a high number of preferences for Essen-
tial (46) and Reassuring(42), reflecting the fact that
users sense the importance of a tangible feeling of
reassurance. Similar to Q1, the third most voted re-
sponse is Annoying (23) followed by Excessive (16).
Very few respondents considered the password man-
agement to be Fun (2) or Beautiful (5).
What we can understand from the responses is that
the respondents seem to grasp the Essential nature of
security ceremonies, and they also feel Reassured by
security measures such as passwords and mobile to-
kens. However, they undoubtedly feel annoyed and
consider the security measures Excessive, especially
for password-like ceremonies. The burden of having
external devices such as token generators or compli-
cated passwords could be responsible for the number
of Annoying responses. In designing more beautiful
security ceremonies we have to take this into account.
If we focus on the Fun and Beautiful aspects, we
can see that a majority of the users believe that hav-
ing a secret code in a childish context is funny but
also beautiful and Engaging, as compared to the other
two contexts. In Q2, we did not mention details like
the complexity of the secret but, even so, the per-
ceived positivity of this Peppa Pig experience reveals
the negativity of existing real-life security measures.
If we return to what Carritt (Carritt, 1932) says,
these negative experiences and perceptions will lead
to users not considering the engagement with security
ceremonies to be “beautiful”.
3.5.2 Findings from Q4
In Q4, we analysed the 100 open-ended question re-
sponses. From an open-ended question we expected
several possible kinds of answer, which we had not
only to check but also to classify. In questions like
this, some respondents just provide a random answer
as they are not interested, or are too lazy, to think and
provide a meaningful answer. Our analysis approach
was the following. First of all, we skimmed the list for
yes/no/I-don’t-know answers, removing 27 answers.
After that, we removed 32 answers that we deemed
to be out of context (e.g., due to apparent misunder-
standings). We classified and grouped the 41 remain-
ing answers based on the general idea or suggestions
that they communicated.
The results are shown in Table 1. The general
categories that emerged from the analysis are: SMS,
Geolocation, Biometric, Alert and Password. SMS
suggests to use text messages to warn the users that
something is happening. Geolocation suggests to use
the GPS position or Wi-Fi location to prove that some
operations are allowed from the place where they are
executed. Biometric suggests the use of fingerprint or
face recognition, or other biometric-recognition tech-
nology to authenticate the users. Alert suggests the
use of some kind of notification (e.g., push notifica-
tions) to alert the users. Password suggests that pass-
words be used, but that they be improved in different
ways (e.g., reducing the number of characters, relax-
ing some of the constraints on character type, or the
“distance” from the previous password).
Table 1: Categories for the answers to question Q4
SMS Location Biometric Alert Passwd
7 2 17 8 7
Biometric technology was suggested by 17 re-
spondents as a viable way to beautify the security ex-
perience, thanks in particular to the recent spread of
fingerprint and face recognition facilitated by smart-
phone manufacturers. 8 respondents expressed the
will to improve cyber security by using some kind of
alerting system through notifications, as long as this is
integrated into a two-factor or multi-factor authentica-
tion solution with multiple devices enabled to receive
warnings.
New methods based on passwords and SMS-
enabled technology were indicated by seven respon-
dents. Finally, two respondents suggested using ge-
olocation as a method that checks the position of de-
vices to authorise certain operations.
4 OPERATIONALISING THE
FINDINGS
The idea behind the questionnaire was to understand
how people characterise the beauty of security cere-
monies in such a way that we could formulate general
guidelines to inform the design of beautiful security
ceremonies, or of beautified versions of existing secu-
rity ceremonies. The previous Section presented the
answers to our questionnaire and reported the insights
we gained. Such insights can be generalised as a va-
riety of guidelines. Here we report the four that we
deem most relevant. They derive from the four ques-
tions seen above, respectively.
G1. Feel unencumbered: you do not need to carry any-
thing along.
G2. Leverage the sense of the group.
G3. Simplify the rules, even though they seem essen-
tial.
G4. Use biometrics techniques.
G1 enhances the sense of freedom and it comes
from the the insights originated from Q1. At some
point, security analysts ruled that “possessing” some-
thing enables us to pursue security through what we
hold. This changed the pre-existing password ap-
proach due to the perception that holding something is
easier than remembering complicated password. Un-
fortunately, this is not always true. Human nature
makes us prone to forgetting seldom-used objects and
we also easily lose small objects. Cards and one-time
token generators are good examples of objects that are
easily lost or mislaid.
However, a ceremony that asks a user to prove that
they hold an object might not be the best solution to
the perceived unattractiveness of existing security cer-
emonies. The need to possess an essential security
ceremony object could easily be considered burden-
some. It can lead to frustration each time a user can-
not engage with it. This is why we advance guideline
G1 as a solution to this burden every time a person
needs to demonstrate ownership of a physical object.
G2, which derives from the insights for Q2, is
oriented at a ceremony design that makes the user
feel part of a group. This situation is well repre-
sented in the Peppa Pig episode (Peppa, 2010) where
having a secret word implies being part of a secret
club. This view was supported by the responses that
we obtained in the questionnaire because the situ-
ation we described was perceived as being Fun by
most respondents. Although it would seem unusual
to achieve this level of agreement in a such diverse
context, we want to strive towards exciting that same
feeling of enthusiasm when people interact with sys-
tems securely.
G3, stemming from Q3, is a reasonable assump-
tion based on the fact that having simpler ceremony
rules improves the user’s experience while preserv-
ing security. What G3 advances is an approach that
urges a return to simpler rules, thereby freeing the
users from any extra burdens in the execution of es-
sential security ceremonies. Einstein famously said
that things should be “made as simple as possible, but
no simpler”. This applies admirably to our security
context.
G4 suggests using “something you are” in secu-
rity ceremonies. The answers to Q1 and Q3 revealed
that users considered “something you know”, such as
a password, as well as “something you have” burden-
some. An alternative approach that might be more
acceptable could be the use of biometrics, as high-
lighted in the responses to Q4. Although the use of
biometrics is not exempt from critique as many users
(and some developers of security solutions) are con-
cerned about their privacy ramifications, a variety of
different biometrics are available and they do appear
to represent a reasonable compromise, also convey-
ing a sense of play and of being “cool and modern” in
achieving security.
If we are able to introduce G4 in ceremonies, we
will likely obtain a positive response from the users.
5 APPLYING BEAUTIFYING
GUIDELINES
Figure 2: The current Italian voting ceremony
Figure 3: Potentially beautified Italian voting ceremony
Bella and Vigano` (Bella and Vigano`, 2015) high-
lighted the crucial aspects of security ceremonies to
acknowledge the value of beautifying ceremonies.
Developers can avoid their ceremony becoming inef-
fective when people bypass it due to its unattractive-
ness. However, achieving cyber security requires sys-
tems to interact with many other pre-existing systems’
ceremonies. Some of these are so part-and-parcel of
others’ systems that it might be difficult to replace
them with more beautiful ceremonies built following
our guidelines. We are concerned with the possibil-
ity of improving an existing security system with as
little effort as possible. Our intention is (i) to take a
system that does not reflect the beautiful security ap-
proach (Bella and Vigano`, 2015) yet it is secure in the
(often) optimistic assumption that the users will use
it precisely as intended by the system designers, and
(ii) to beautify the system following our guidelines so
that this assumption becomes less optimistic and more
realistic.
In the remainder of this Section, we consider four
ceremonies that are, we believe, in dire need of beau-
tification:
1. the Italian voting ceremony,
2. the Laptop login ceremony,
3. the Password setup ceremony, and
4. the EU Premises access ceremony.
We discuss ways to make such ceremonies more
beautiful and for each of them we present a specific
beautified version that we have devised, with the ex-
ception of the improved Laptop login ceremony that
has already been developed by Apple.
The beautification changes that we propose reflect
the guidelines we identified in the previous Section
(and also reflect the authors’ combined experience of
designing Socio-Technical Systems). In the following
Section, we will then report on the second question-
naire that we issued to assess whether the new ver-
sions of the security ceremonies that we present here
are indeed perceived to have been beautified.
5.1 Italian voting ceremony
Figure 2 shows the voting ceremony currently used
in elections in Italy. Here, and in the following, we
represent security ceremonies by means of Message
Sequence Charts (MSCs), which show the messages
exchanged by the principals (agents) participating in
the ceremony, as well as the internal computation
that is performed by the principals. The MSCs that
we consider in this paper are, hopefully, quite self-
explanatory.
In the Italian ceremony in Figure 2, there are only
two principals: a user (the voter) and an employee of
the polling station (the voting officer). This ceremony
Figure 4: votingCard cur-
rently used in Italian elec-
tions.
Figure 5: A successful
MacBook login by Apple
Watch
could be considered outdated in comparison with the
voting ceremonies adopted in other countries. The
outdated part of the ceremony would be represented
by the need of the voter to have two different docu-
ments:
1. a national ID card (or any other identification doc-
ument such as a passport or a driving licence) and
2. a votingCard, issued by the city hall to record that
a voter has cast a vote in this election.
This votingCard, which is shown in Figure 4, rep-
resents the ceremony’s main sticking point for two
primary reasons. Firstly, votingCards are stamped at
each election, and they fill up. If this happens, there
are no more spaces for the voting officer to stamp the
votingCard to register the voter’s presence. A second
problem occurs when a voter loses their votingCard.
In both cases, the voter will first need to obtain a new
votingCard from official sources at the city hall in or-
der to be able to vote in this election (and some of the
following ones, until the new votingCard is full).
During electoral rounds in the last years, these
two issues have created particularly obvious difficul-
ties, with long queues snaking out of city hall offices
across Italy, populated by voters needing to obtain
new copies of their votingCards.
The complication comes from the use of a sin-
gle document (the votingCard) for two different pur-
poses: (1) a voting register and (2) an eligibility
proof. Voters experience frustration, especially if the
votingCard’s spaces have been filled up, in which
case the votingCard only satisfies one of its two pur-
poses: eligibility. Recrafting this ceremony offers us
a clear-cut opportunity for improvement.
The new ceremony in Figure 3 applies what we
have suggested with G1 and G3, essentially simpli-
fying the actual ceremony. We suggest replacing the
“what you hold” object (the votingCard in this case).
The simplest way to replace the votingCard would
be to use a system that needs the voter only to present
their national ID card (or identification document),
in its electronic form. The polling station employee
would check the voter’s eligibility and record their
presence in a centralised database, by interacting on-
line with a third principal in the ceremony (the “sys-
tem”). The voter would no longer need to “hold” the
votingCard that causes all the problems stated earlier.
5.2 Laptop login ceremony
Every day, users have to enter multiple passwords into
their laptops (and computers). These passwords are
becoming longer and more complex over time due to
the security requirements enforced by operating sys-
tems. Figure 6 shows “password entry”, the login
ceremony currently enforced by most laptop models.
We can of course all agree that passwords are essen-
tial, but our questionnaire respondents confirmed our
personal intuition (and our personal experience) that
users increasingly dread this ceremony.
To simplify the login, Apple has developed a new
way to login on its latest laptops by means of its Ap-
ple Watch product.3 It is coherent with our guideline
G2 if we see the Apple Watch as a distinctive feature
of a group. This authentication method is incorpo-
rated in the beautified ceremony shown in Figure 7.
Every time the user needs to wake up her MacBook,
she just needs to press a key on the keyboard or touch
the trackpad; after that, the system looks for a paired
Apple Watch and if it finds one, the MacBook unlocks
itself without requesting any other actions. A success-
ful outcome is demonstrated in Figure 5. Similar cer-
emonies using one or more small portable/wearable
devices have also been proposed (Stajano, 2011).
Figure 6: The widespread Laptop login ceremony
5.3 Password setup ceremony
In 2003, the National Institute of Standards and Tech-
nology, published the NIST Special Publication 800-
3Google and Microsoft are similarly planning to remove
passwords using the protocol Fido in conjunction with An-
droid phones or physical tokens, respectively.
Figure 7: A potentially beautified Laptop login ceremony
(by Apple Watch)
63 (Burr et al., 2004), where they suggested that users
protect their accounts by inventing “awkward”, new
passwords that include uppercase and lowercase let-
ters, numbers and special characters, and by chang-
ing their password regularly. Such passwords aim to
be less guessable (e.g., more resistant to dictionary
attacks). Nowadays, this is common practice, with
websites and services forcing users to craft passwords
respecting these constraints. Figure 8 shows a cere-
mony that reflects this practice.
In 2017, Bill Burr, the person who originally pro-
posed the rules, declared that he regretted publishing
those strict rules (McMillan, 2017). In fact, the new
NIST document published in June 2017 (Grassi et al.,
2017, Section 5.1.1.1) contains the following novel
guidelines:
“...memorized secrets shall be at least 8 char-
acters in length if chosen by the subscriber.
Memorized secrets chosen randomly by the
Credential Service Provider (CSP) or verifier
shall be at least 6 characters in length and
may be entirely numeric. If the CSP or verifier
disallows a chosen memorized secret based
on its appearance on a blacklist of compro-
mised values, the subscriber shall be required
to choose a different memorized secret. No
other complexity requirements for memorized
secrets should be imposed.”
Applying these guidelines, it is possible to propose a
new ceremony that allows users to choose whatever
password they want, morphing the security compo-
nent into a check on the number of times a password is
typed incorrectly. By doing so, we simplify the rules
imposed by the ceremony as suggested by G3. Fig-
ure 9 shows the new “Password setup” ceremony that
we propose.
Figure 8: The current Password setup ceremony (using
NIST 2003 rules)
Figure 9: A potentially beautified Password setup ceremony
(using the new NIST rules)
5.4 EU premises access ceremony
Those wishing to gain access to highly-secure build-
ings, such as some EU premises, have to engage with
an authentication ceremony like the one shown in Fig-
ure 10, in which the security staff check both a visi-
tor’s photo-ID (e.g., a national ID card or a passport)
and their fingerprint, which is stored in a database.
This ceremony thus requires a first-time visitor to
engage in a time-consuming fingerprint-registration
process. This ceremony is repetitive in the case of re-
turning visitors, hence especially frustrating if a per-
son needs to access the premises, for example, multi-
ple times a day.
Figure 10: The current EU premises access ceremony
Figure 11: A potentially beautified EU premises access cer-
emony
We can apply G4 to make the ceremony (more)
beautiful. Still using biometric technology, it is possi-
ble to devise a leaner ceremony that requires the user
to engage with fewer interactions. In this beautified
ceremony, shown in Figure 11, we have removed the
document check for the entrances after the first one,
so that the main security checks are only addressed by
means of fingerprint control.
6 CROWDSOURCING FOR THE
APPLICATION OF BEAUTIFUL
SECURITY
Our second questionnaire aimed to determine whether
applying our guidelines to ceremonies, or highlight-
ing improvements based on our guidelines in existing
ceremonies, had been effective. We wanted to find
out whether the beautified alternative we present to
the respondents is indeed considered a positive im-
provement, or not.
6.1 Design of the second questionnaire
We designed the questionnaire to present two alterna-
tive versions of the same ceremony: an original and
a beautified one, the latter arrived at by applying one
or more of the beautification guidelines. To that end,
we presented respondents with the four different cere-
monies we described in Section 5. Respondents were
asked to answer by giving a preference on which of
the two versions of each ceremony they think is the
most beautiful.
The questionnaire consisted of the following four
closed-ended questions, allowing people to respond
with a single preference:
Q1: You have to choose a new system to be authenti-
cated to vote in an election. Which of the follow-
ing two alternative systems is more beautiful?
1. A system that requires you to bring your “vot-
ing eligibility certificate” in addition to your ID
Card.
2. A system that requires you to bring only an
electronic ID document.
Q2; You have to choose a new system to log in on your
laptop. Which of the following two alternative
systems is more beautiful?
1. A system that requires you to type in your pass-
word.
2. A system that requires you to approach your
laptop with your smart watch.
Q3: You have to choose a new authentication system.
Which of the following two alternative systems is
more beautiful?
1. A system that requires you to insert a complex
password (including requirements such as min-
imum number of characters, or the use of capi-
tal letters, numbers and special characters).
2. A system that requires you to insert whatever
password you want but it limits the number of
times you may type the password incorrectly
before getting locked out.
Q4: The security officers at the entrance of a secure
building have registered your ID and fingerprint
on the system once you have completed the reg-
istration. Which of the following two alternatives
to access the building from now on is more beau-
tiful?
1. ID + fingerprint every time.
2. Fingerprint every time.
Q1 thus refers to the two versions of the Italian voting
ceremony; Q2 to the two versions of the Laptop login
ceremony; Q3 to the two versions of the Password
setup ceremony; Q4 to the two versions of the EU
Premises access ceremony.
6.2 Findings
We administered the questionnaire to one hundred re-
spondents using the CrowdFlower platform, not con-
straining respondents in terms of language or geogra-
phy. As we remarked above, CrowdFlower workers
span the globe, so we were assured of a heteroge-
neous sample. In order to obtain more focused an-
swers from semi-expert respondents, we also admin-
istered the questionnaire to 24 students of the “Cryp-
tography and Information Security” course that one
of the authors is teaching. The students attending this
module are computer science or mathematics students
in the final year of their undergraduate studies or in
the first year of their master’s studies. We can thus
call these respondents “security-savvy”, in contrast to
the “generic” respondents on CrowdFlower. Security-
savvy respondents were asked the same questions
Q1–Q4 but were also shown the MSCs of the cere-
monies.
The combined results of the second questionnaire
are shown in Figure 12 and we now wish to take stock
and reflect on the responses that we received. The
respondents provided us with extremely useful, and
to some extent slightly surprising, feedback.
Figure 12: Data obtained from the second crowdsourcing
The answers to the first question clearly indicate
that both generic and security-savvy users find the
beautified Italian voting ceremony that we propose
to be considerably more beautiful than the ceremony
currently in use.
The answers to the fourth question indicate even
more strongly that both generic and security-savvy
users find the novel EU Premises access ceremony
that we propose to be considerably more beautiful
than the ceremony currently in use.
Our respondents were almost equally split be-
tween the original versions of the second and third
ceremonies we considered and their beautified ver-
sions. It is, however, instructive to analyse the re-
sponses in more detail.
Consider the password setup ceremony. It is in-
teresting to note that the 100 generic respondents
have a minimal preference for the proposed beau-
tified ceremony that uses the new NIST rules (51
vs. 49), whereas almost 60% of the semi-expert stu-
dents would rather engage in the original ceremony
based on the 2003 NIST rules. We believe that these
results are evidence to the fact that the respondents,
especially the security-savvy ones, perceived the orig-
inal ceremony to be more robust than the newly pro-
posed ceremony, although the latter is potentially
more lean and beautiful.
Finally, consider the laptop login ceremony. In
this case, 54% of the generic respondents preferred
the original ceremony, whereas 62.5% of the security-
savvy respondents preferred the novel ceremony us-
ing the smart watch. We believe that this indi-
cates that young computer-science/mathematics stu-
dents are more likely to embrace novel technologies
than the cohort of generic respondents, which in-
cludes people of different age, education and back-
ground, who are thus more likely to meet such tech-
nologies with suspicion or even rejection (perhaps
also due to the elitist nature of such technologies).
7 CONCLUDING REMARKS AND
FUTURE WORK
This paper described how we went about finding a
way to beautify security ceremonies, thereby making
beautiful security achievable in practice. We first ex-
plored the literature to find out what beauty means to
users, specifically in the context of interaction with
software systems. We then explored general percep-
tions of security ceremonies by posing questions to
crowdsourcing respondents. Having gained insights
from this process, we proceeded to “beautify” four
security ceremonies. We then posed another round of
questions to crowdsourced participants to judge the
success of our beautification of ceremonies. Overall,
the outcome of the final stage confirmed that two of
the four beautified ceremonies were indeed perceived
to be more beautiful than they had previously been.
The other two beautified ceremonies were not per-
ceived to be more beautiful by our respondents.
The use of crowdsourcing enabled us to explore
and implement the “beautiful” security paradigm,
and gain feedback from a diverse and global audi-
ence. Our experiments confirmed that security cer-
emony design has plenty of scope to consider in-
stilling beauty — with the general aim of achieving
more beautiful security ceremonies. The assump-
tion that people are normally attracted to beauty, as
vastly substantiated by the relevant literature, will
then strengthen such a design because it will be se-
cure not just in isolation but when used by its users.
Beauty may reinforce the designers’ assumptions that
the users will conform to the ceremony as intended.
A variety of real-world ceremonies would bene-
fit from being subjected to a beautification process
based on guidelines such as those proposed here. The
process itself could be developed further, for example
by combining and leveraging several guidelines at the
same time. This will be particularly important in the
case of ceremonies such as Password setup, on which
our experiments showed that beauty will also need
to convey robustness. The Laptop login ceremony,
where newer technologies such as the Apple Watch
are used, might not yet be considered to be beautiful
by the wider population today.
The methodology discussed here has reached the
development stage of a proof of concept but we are
aware that it must be developed further. For instance,
we plan to repeat the crowdsourcing experiments over
a larger sample population to reinforce the actual
beautification guidelines as well as the confirmation
that the beatification has succeeded.
Moreover, although beautifying existing cere-
monies may sometimes lead to simplifying them, sim-
plicity did not turn up in the categories that emerged
from the analysis of answers to open question Q4.
Arguably, simplifying a security ceremony might
compromise security; we thus also plan to develop
combinations of empirical, analytical and formal ap-
proaches (Bella and Coles-Kemp, 2012; Radke et al.,
2011; Karlof et al., 2009; Martina et al., 2015) to help
ensure that when the new paradigm is applied to a
ceremony, possibly simplifying it, it remains secure.
This will require defining degrees of ceremony attrac-
tiveness for humans in a formal, logico-mathematical
way, in order to then be able to reason about the inter-
play of beautification and security, ultimately ensur-
ing that the beauty of a ceremony does not come at
the expense of its security (which might be the case
for some of the ceremonies we considered, e.g., if
users choose weak passwords), but instead provably
reinforces its security. We expect that this will ulti-
mately lead to defining criteria that formalise when
beautification preserves or reinforces security.
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